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ABSTRACT
One of today’s major concerns is how easily digital information can
be copied and disseminated. Thus, when one’s private information becomes
publicly available in digital format, that information can be readily
duplicated and distributed across the globe within seconds. If the
disseminated information includes credit card numbers or Social Security
numbers, then there is a heightened exposure to identity theft and a host of
other privacy-related crimes.
Given the existence of such a digital landmine, laws have been
promulgated for various sectors (e.g., financial, healthcare, government,
etc.) to protect personally-identifiable information. However, due to
differing needs of the various sectors, each sector treats its data differently
from other sectors.
Compounding to this sector-by-sector discrepancy, several states
have enacted their own laws relating to personally-identifiable data. Thus,
the treatment of personally-identifiable data can differ from state to state, as
well as from sector to sector. This presents numerous compliance
challenges to a business should it collect, use, and share personallyidentifiable information as part of its business model. A company, even one
of modest size with a small customer base, still faces questions as to which
compliance structure it must follow: Must it comply with the laws of the
state in which its customer resides? Is it governed by an overarching federal
framework? Or, does it need to comply with a particular sector in which it
does business, such as healthcare? A company can easily be paralyzed
attempting to determine which laws govern the personally-identifiable
information in its possession. This is to say nothing of the significant
increase in its compliance burden should there be a transfer of information
to and from a foreign country (or compliance regime), such as the European
Union (EU) or countries in the Asia Pacific Economic Conference (APEC).
With these issues in mind, this paper examines whether an omnibus
privacy statute can be crafted such that it adequately addresses each sector.
While this paper takes no position either for or against an omnibus privacy
statute, it shows the feasibility of crafting such a statute should such a
privacy statute be deemed necessary.
Specifically, this paper presents a model omnibus privacy statute,
which: (1) identifies categories of personally-identifiable data that are
common across most sectors and across all states; (2) identifies particular
data elements that fall within each of these categories; and (3) prescribes the
treatment of these data elements (both in how to collect the data and in how
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to protect the data after collection) based on their respective categories.
Briefly, this paper proposes three distinct categories, namely: (1) high-risk
data elements (which, standing alone, can identify a particular individual or
cause harm); (2) mid-risk data elements (which can identify a particular
individual or cause harm when combined with other mid-risk data); and (3)
low-risk data elements (which cannot identify a particular individual unless
used in conjunction with high-risk or mid-risk data).
Lastly, in the spirit of creating solutions through such an omnibus
privacy statute, we humbly suggest a model form which a compliant
business organization can use in the collection, use, and sharing of
personally-identifiable information. A practical privacy-enabling tool, such
as a standard universal form for the collection of personally-identifiable
information, not only meets the letter of the law, but provides an operational
method by which employees and managers of any level of training can
follow to ensure that the privacy protections of the statute truly follow the
data from the point of collection and beyond.
I. INTRODUCTION
Even before the U.S. Supreme Court found an implied right of
privacy in the Fourth Amendment,3 an individual’s right to privacy was an
emerging legal issue.4 At least one aspect of privacy that remains constant
over time is that much of the debate revolves around technology. For
example, Warren and Brandeis wrote their article on privacy in response to
increasing numbers of newspapers and photographs that were made possible
by the printing press.5 While the Gutenberg press may be a distant historical
memory for today’s on-demand generation, the Internet (and electronic
media in general) is fertile grounds for privacy debate.
Academic journals are replete with articles that oppose an omnibus
federal privacy statute for various reasons.6 Similarly, there are articles that
advocate for a federal privacy statute to unify the disparate treatment of data
elements across different sectors.7 Given that such scholarly writings exist,
and much of the pros and cons of an omnibus privacy statute are discussed
by other learned scholars, this paper does not seek to advance one position
over the other. In other words, we do not argue the merits or demerits of an
omnibus federal privacy statute.
Instead, the goal of this paper is simply to provide a structural
3

See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890).
5
See, e.g., Wikipedia, Privacy, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privacy (last visited May 3, 2010).
6
See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 902 (2009).
7
See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Federalization in Information Privacy Law, 118 YALE L.J. 868, 868
(2009); Candice L. Kline, Security Theater and Database-Driven Information Markets: A Case for an
Omnibus U.S. Data Privacy Statute, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 443, 443 (2008).
4
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guideline on how an omnibus privacy statute should be written, in the event
that Congress chooses to craft such a statute. In short, we do not discuss the
“whether” question in this article, but rather the “how” question. This is
because few, if any, articles address the “how” issue.
Structurally, we begin with a brief overview of currently-existing
privacy-related statutes, both in the federal arena and the state arena.8 In
analyzing these laws, we focus on legislatively-enacted laws that address
privacy concerns on a sector-by-sector basis, instead of on the judicial
decisions that interpret those laws. The reason for our narrow focus stems
from our goal of eventually crafting an omnibus privacy statute for
collecting and protecting personally-identifiable information. Additionally,
we intentionally limit the depth of our statutory review, because an
exhaustive analysis of each statute is unnecessary for our purposes.
Once these federal and state privacy statutes are reviewed for their
respective data elements,9 we attempt to glean concepts that these statutes
have in common, despite their applications in different arenas. From that
analysis, we propose a model privacy statute that attempts to simplify
handling of information across the many different sectors, both business and
governmental. Furthermore, we suggest a proposed compliant intake form
for the collection of personally-identifiable information that categorizes the
information at the point of collection.
With this in mind, we now move to our review of privacy statutes,
both in the federal arena and in the state arena.
II. REVIEW OF PRIVACY STATUTES
Many statutes either directly or indirectly implicate privacy. To
discuss all of those laws without a specific focus would be both
uninteresting and unhelpful. Thus, for purposes of this paper, we select only
a handful of privacy-related statutes, which directly address privacy
concerns. From these statutes, we attempt to: (a) discern overarching
themes in how various entities approach data protection; and (b) identify
recognizable categories for different types of data. Once the broad
categories of data are identified, we take individual data elements and place
them within their respective categories.
8

We acknowledge the existence of the Wiretap Statutes (e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006); 47
U.S.C. § 605 (2006)), the Surveillance Statutes (e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2006)), and the Polygraph
Statutes (29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (2006)). However, those types of statutes are beyond the scope of this
paper, because the Surveillance and Wiretap Statutes regulate data-interception techniques, rather than
regulating the treatment of different data types. Our paper focuses narrowly on regulating the collection
and disclosure of particular data types, rather than on the interception of every data type.
9
Throughout this paper, unless otherwise specified, we use the phrase “data element” or “data
elements” to mean a particular piece of information that is associated with an individual. Some examples
of data elements include first name, last name, Social Security number, phone number, physical address,
zip code, height, weight, blood type, driver’s license number, etc.
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A. Data Elements from Selected U.S. Federal Statutes
There are a host of U.S. federal statutes that directly implicate
Each statute seeks to regulate a particular business or
privacy.
governmental sector. For example, some statutes regulate the financial
sector,11 other statutes govern the healthcare industry,12 and still other
statutes restrict the federal or state government.13 Thus, while these sectors
collect overlapping data elements (e.g., name, address, telephone number,
Social Security number, etc.), oftentimes each sector treats some of the data
elements in a noticeably different manner.
10

Our goal in this section is to identify, if possible, relevant data
elements for each statute. Thereafter, we briefly discuss how data categories
or data elements are treated, generally.
1. Right to Financial Privacy Act
The Right to Financial Privacy Act (“RFPA”) protects an
individual’s financial records from disclosure, with certain exceptions.14
Financial records, according to the RFPA, are broadly defined to include
“information known to have been derived from . . . any record held by a
financial institution pertaining to a customer’s relationship with the financial
institution,”15 and any “disclosure of any financial records or information
which is not identified with or identifiable as being derived from the
financial records of a particular customer.”16 Thus, while the RFPA does
not expressly define each of the data elements that are a part of an
individual’s “financial records,” the RFPA prohibits the disclosure of
information that can be identified with a particular individual.
Relevant to our paper, one shortcoming of the RFPA is that it does
not specify which data elements, either alone or in combination, are
10
See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2006); Right to Financial Privacy
Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2006); Census Confidentiality Statute, 13 U.S.C. § 9 (2006); Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006); Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§
6501-6506 (2006), 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2009); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2006);
Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006); Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18
U.S.C. § 2721 (2006); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006); Tax
Reform Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103, 6108 (2006); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1181-1183 (2006), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7c (2006), 45 C.F.R. §§ 160-164 (2009); Health
Research Data Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 242m (2006); Criminal Justice Information Systems Act, 42 U.S.C. §
3789g (2006).
11
See, e.g., Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2006); Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2006).
12
See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-1183 (2006), 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-7c, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160-164 (2009).
13
See, e.g., Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2006); Driver’s Privacy Protection
Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2006); Criminal Justice Information Systems Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3789g
(2006).
14
See Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3402-3403 (2006).
15
Id. § 3401(2).
16
Id. § 3413(a).
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identified or identifiable with a particular individual.
2. Census Confidentiality Statute
The Census Confidentiality Statute (“CCS”) prohibits certain
governmental entities from “mak[ing] any publication whereby the data
furnished by any particular . . . individual . . . can be identified.”17 Similar
to the RFPA, the CCS: (a) does not expressly recite each of the data
elements that the Census Bureau collects; but (b) generally prohibits
publication of personally-identifiable information.
Similar to the RFPA’s shortcoming, the CCS also does not indicate
which data elements, either alone or in combination, are personallyidentifiable data elements.
3. Fair Credit Reporting Act
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) allows disclosure of
consumer reports only for statutorily-permissible purposes.18 The FCRA
defines consumer reports to include “any information by a consumer
reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing,
credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or
mode of living . . . .”19 By including “character, general reputation, personal
character, or mode of living,” the FCRA broadly prohibits disclosure of
personally-identifiable information. And it is this broad application that
makes compliance difficult.
For example, the general texts of
“creditworthy” or “not creditworthy” are not individually identifiable;
rather, they are only individually identifiable when combined with an
element that identifies the individual. However, as broadly classified here,
the terms are prohibited from use in perfectly compliant statistical reporting
or other analysis using only that text.
Similar to the CCS and RFPA, the FCRA also suffers from a lack of
definition on which data elements, if any, can identify an individual.
4. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998
The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (“COPPA”)
proscribes collection of personal information of a child.20 Noticeably
different about the COPPA (as compared to the previously-examined
statutes) are: (a) COPPA regulates the collection of data (rather than merely
regulating the dissemination of data); and (b) COPPA expressly defines data

17
18
19
20

Census Confidentiality Statute, 13 U.S.C. § 9(a)(2) (2006).
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b, 1681e(a) (2006).
Id. § 1681a(d)(1).
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1)-(b) (2006).
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elements that it considers to be personal information.21
The individual data elements that are expressly recited include: first
name; last name; home address; other physical address; street name; name
of a city; name of a town; email address; telephone number; and Social
Security number.22 By its own terms, the list is not limiting, insofar as the
COPPA also prohibits collection of “any other identifier that the
Commission determines permits the physical or online contacting of a
specific individual . . . .”23 Moreover, the COPPA also proscribes the
collection of information that combines with one or more of the expresslyrecited data elements.24
5. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) prescribes the conditions
under which financial institutions can disclose “nonpublic personal
information.”25 Similar to the other privacy statutes implicating personally
identifiable information,26 the GLBA provides a relatively amorphous (and
somewhat unhelpful) definition of nonpublic personal information; namely,
by defining personally identifiable financial information27 axiomatically as
information that “does not include publicly available information.”28 As
such, the GLBA provides no guidance with reference to individual data
elements.
6. Electronic Communications Privacy Act
Under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), an
email or network service provider is prohibited from “knowingly divulg[ing]
a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of
such service . . . to any governmental entity.”29
Unfortunately, while the ECPA includes a definitions section,30

21
Id. § 6501(8)(A)-(G) (“The term ‘personal information’ means individually identifiable
information about an individual collected online, including — (A) a first and last name; (B) a home or
other physical address including street name and name of a city or town; (C) an e-mail address; (D) a
telephone number; (E) a Social Security number; (F) any other identifier that the Commission determines
permits the physical or online contacting of a specific individual; or (G) information concerning the child
or the parents of that child that the website collects online from the child and combines with an identifier
described in this paragraph.”).
22
Id. § 6501(8)(A)-(E).
23
Id. § 6501(8)(F).
24
Id. § 6501(8)(G).
25
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a) (2006) (“[A] financial institution may not, directly
or through any affiliate, disclose to a nonaffiliated third party any nonpublic personal information . . . .”).
26
Id. §§ 1681a(d)(1), 6501(8)(A)-(G), 6502(a)(1).
27
Id. § 6809(4)(A).
28
Id. § 6809(4)(B).
29
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) (2006).
30
Id. § 2711.
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which cross-references the definitions section of the Federal Wiretap Act,31
neither of these statutory sections provides any definition of the term record.
As such, the ECPA is devoid of any definition that explains what data
elements, if any, are safe-guarded.
7. Video Privacy Protection Act
Both the Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”) and the ECPA can
be seen as a sub-category of the Stored Wire and Electronic
Communications and Transactional Records Access provisions in Title 18.32
Yet, we address the VPPA as a separate item because the VPPA appears to
define “personally-identifiable information” in a manner that makes little
sense with reference to the remainder of the ECPA. Specifically, the VPPA
defines personally-identifiable information as “information which identifies
a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services
from a video tape service provider . . . .”33 As one can readily see, the
VPPA provides little guidance on what data elements fall within the
category of “personally-identifiable information.”
8. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act
The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”) prohibits disclosure
of both personal information and highly restricted personal information,
except for statutorily-enumerated permissible uses.34 In doing so, the DPPA
is one of the few statutes that both: (a) identifies data elements; and (b)
categorizes the identified data elements into distinct categories.
The broad category of personal information is defined as
information that identifies an individual, such as an individual’s: (a)
photograph; (b) Social Security number; (c) driver identification number; (d)
name; (e) address (but not the 5-digit zip code); (f) telephone number; and
(g) medical or disability information.35 The DPPA identifies permissible
uses for an individual’s personal information.
Within the category of personal information are those the DPPA
considers to be highly restricted personal information, such as an
individual’s: (a) photograph or image; (b) Social Security number; and (c)
medical or disability information.36 The permissible uses for this highly
restricted personal information are a much smaller subset than the uses
permitted for non-highly restricted but personal information.

31
32
33
34
35
36

Id. § 2510.
See Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006).
Id. § 2710(a)(3).
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2006).
Id. § 2725(3).
Id. § 2725(4).
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Data elements that are specifically excluded from personal
information include: (a) information on vehicular accidents; (b) driving
violations; and (c) driver’s status.37 For these categories, it appears there are
no restrictions on disclosure or use.
The DPPA expressly recites data elements that fall within three
specific categories, namely: (a) highly restricted personal information; (b)
personal information that is not highly restricted; and (c) information that is
not subject to disclosure restrictions. In doing so, the DPPA provides much
more than the amorphous descriptions found in many other statutes.
9. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”)
prohibits publication of directory information of a minor student, unless the
parents of the minor student have been afforded the opportunity to object to
the publication of the directory information.38 In other words, the FERPA
provides an opt-out mechanism for directory information. This directory
information under FERPA includes a student’s: (a) name; (b) address; (c)
telephone listing; (d) date of birth; (e) place of birth; (f) major field of study;
(g) participation in officially recognized activities and sports; (h) weight and
height of members of athletic teams; (i) dates of attendance; (j) degrees and
awards received; and (k) most recent previous educational agency or
institution attended by the student.39
In the companion section on the protection of pupil’s rights,40 the
statute prohibits compelling a student to divulge: (1) political affiliations or
beliefs of the student or the student’s parent; (2) mental or psychological
problems of the student or the student’s family; (3) sex behavior or attitudes;
(4) illegal, anti-social, self-incriminating, or demeaning behavior; (5) critical
appraisals of other individuals with whom respondents have close family
relationships; (6) legally recognized privileged or analogous relationships,
such as those of lawyers, physicians, and ministers; (7) religious practices,
affiliations, or beliefs of the student or the student’s parent; or (8) income
(other than that required by law to determine eligibility for participation in a
program or for receiving financial assistance under such program).41 It
should, however, be noted a student may voluntarily provide this
information.
Also, “[a]ctivities involving the collection, disclosure, or use of
personal information collected from students for the purpose of marketing or
37
38
39
40
41
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Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(5)(B) (2006).
Id. § 1232g(a)(5)(A).
Id. § 1232h.
Id. § 1232h(b).
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for selling that information” require notification (i.e., an opportunity to optout).42 Under this section, personal information is defined as individuallyidentifiable information, including: “(i) a student or parent’s first and last
name; (ii) a home or other physical address (including street name and the
name of the city or town); (iii) a telephone number; or (iv) a Social Security
identification number.”43 With the exception of one data element (email
address), these elements are identical to those found in the COPPA. Also,
these elements have substantial overlap with the highly restricted personal
information found in the DPPA.
One should appreciate the treatment of these data elements under
FERPA (i.e., opt-out mechanism for disclosure) is markedly different than
the treatment of similar data elements under DPPA (i.e., verifiable consent
needed for disclosure, or “opt-in”).
10. Tax Reform Act
The Tax Reform Act (“TRA”) requires all return information to be
confidential, except as authorized by the TRA.44 Under the definitions
section of the TRA, return information is defined as, among other things: (a)
“a taxpayer’s identity”; (b) “the nature, source, or amount of his income,
payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net
worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies, overassessments, or tax
payments”; (c) “whether the taxpayer’s return was, is being, or will be
examined or subject to other investigation or processing”; or (d) “any other
data, received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by the
Secretary with respect to a return or with respect to the determination of the
existence, or possible existence, of liability (or the amount thereof) of any
person under this title for any tax, penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or other
imposition, or offense . . . .”45 The TRA further defines taxpayer identity as
the taxpayer’s name, address, taxpayer identifying number, or any
combination thereof.46
Excluded from a taxpayer’s return information is “data in a form
which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly,
a particular taxpayer.”47 Additionally, the TRA prohibits disclosure of
statistics from any collected information that “shall in any manner permit
the statistics . . . to be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or
indirectly, a particular taxpayer.”48
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id. § 1232h(c)(2)(C)(i).
Id. § 1232h(c)(6)(E).
Tax Reform Act, 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (2006).
Id. § 6103(b)(2)(A).
Id. § 6103(b)(6).
Id. § 6103(b)(2).
Id. § 6108(c).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol35/iss3/4

2010]

MODEL OMNIBUS PRIVACY STATUTE

355

In short, the TRA permits the collection of a taxpayer’s information
and the statistical analysis of the collected information. However, the TRA
prohibits disclosures that can associate a particular data element with a
particular taxpayer, unless that disclosure is expressly permitted by the
TRA.
The data elements the TRA shares with other statutes include name,
address, and Social Security number (referenced more broadly in the TRA
as taxpayer identifying number). But, because the TRA is directed to a
particular governmental sector (i.e., tax), the TRA recites numerous data
elements that are not germane to other sectors.
11. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
One of the more publicized statutes, the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), requires covered entities to “protect[]
the confidentiality of the information and the privacy of individuals
receiving health care services and items.”49 In the administrative rules
promulgated under the HIPAA, covered entities are required to maintain
safeguards against unauthorized disclosure of protected health information,
which is defined as individually identifiable health information.50 In an
axiomatic statement, the regulations exclude from individually identifiable
health information any “information that does not identify an individual and
with respect to which there is no reasonable basis to believe that the
information can be used to identify an individual . . . .”51
Relevant to this paper, the HIPAA recites an extensive list of data
elements (referred to in the HIPAA as “identifiers”), which the regulations
require to be removed for certain types of disclosures.52 The list in 45
49
50
51
52
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Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7c(a)(3)(B)(ii) (2006).
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2009).
Id. § 164.514(a).
Id. § 164.514(b)(2)(i), which recites:
A covered entity may determine that health information is not
individually identifiable health information only if . . . [t]he following identifiers
of the individual or of relatives, employers, or household members of the
individual, are removed:
(A)
Names;
(B)
All geographic subdivisions smaller than a State, including
street address, city, county, precinct, zip code, and their
equivalent geocodes, except for the initial three digits of a
zip code if, according to the current publicly available data
from the Bureau of the Census:
(1) The geographic unit formed by combining all zip
codes with the same three initial digits contains
more than 20,000 people; and
(2) The initial three digits of a zip code for all such
geographic units containing 20,000 or fewer
people is changed to 000.
(C)
All elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related
to an individual, including birth date, admission date,
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C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i) is duplicated, almost in its entirety, in another
section of the regulation, where limited data sets that fall outside of the
realm of protected health information are defined.53
Hence, with reference to the healthcare sector, the HIPAA both: (a)
expressly recites a plethora of data elements (called “direct identifiers” in
the HIPAA); and (b) provides specific guidelines on how those data
elements are to be treated within the healthcare sector.
12. Health Research Data Statute
The Health Research Data Statute (“HRDS”) restricts the use of

53

discharge date, date of death; and all ages over 89 and all
elements of dates (including year) indicative of such age,
except that such ages and elements may be aggregated into a
single category of age 90 or older;
(D)
Telephone numbers;
(E)
Fax numbers;
(F)
Electronic mail addresses;
(G)
Social security numbers;
(H)
Medical record numbers;
(I)
Health plan beneficiary numbers;
(J)
Account numbers;
(K)
Certificate/license numbers;
(L)
Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license
plate numbers;
(M)
Device identifiers and serial numbers;
(N)
Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs);
(O)
Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers;
(P)
Biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints;
(Q)
Full face photographic images and any comparable images;
and
(R)
Any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or
code, except as permitted by paragraph (c) of this section . .
..
Id. § 164.514(e)(2), which defines a limited data set as follows:
A limited data set is protected health information that excludes the
following direct identifiers of the individual or of relatives, employers, or
household members of the individual:
(i)
Names;
(ii)
Postal address information, other than town or city, State,
and zip code;
(iii)
Telephone numbers;
(iv)
Fax numbers;
(v)
Electronic mail addresses;
(vi)
Social security numbers;
(vii)
Medical record numbers;
(viii) Health plan beneficiary numbers;
(ix)
Account numbers;
(x)
Certificate/license numbers;
(xi)
Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license
plate numbers;
(xii)
Device identifiers and serial numbers;
(xiii) Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs);
(xiv) Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers;
(xv)
Biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints; and
(xvi) Full face photographic images and any comparable images.
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information “if an establishment or person supplying the information or
described in it is identifiable . . . .”54 Other than proscribing the use of
information in such general terms, the HRDS provides no guidance on what
data elements, if any, are considered to be “identifiable” information.
13. Criminal Justice Information Systems Act
The Criminal Justice Information Systems Act (“CJISA”) restricts
the use of several categories of information, including research or statistical
information,55 criminal history information,56 and criminal intelligence
information.57 Of these three categories, the CJISA only defines criminal
history information.58 The specific data elements included in the CJISA’s
criminal history information are “records of arrests, the nature and
disposition of criminal charges, sentencing, confinement, rehabilitation, and
release . . . .”59
14. Administrative Procedures Act
The Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) provides detailed
procedures on maintaining and disclosing an individual’s record.60 As
defined by the APA, an individual’s record means
any item, collection, or grouping of information about an
individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but
not limited to, his education, financial transactions, medical
history, and criminal or employment history and that
contains his name, or the identifying number, symbol, or
other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such
as a finger or voice print or a photograph . . . .61
While not directly applicable to this paper, it is worthwhile to note
that, for some of the disclosures mandated under the APA, the decision on
whether or not to remove identifying details from the record are optional
and not mandatory.62

54

Health Research Data Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 242m(d) (2006).
Criminal Justice Information Systems Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3789g(a) (2006).
56
Id. § 3789g(b).
57
Id. § 3789g(c).
58
Id. § 3791(a)(9) (“‘[C]riminal history information’ includes records and related data, contained in
an automated or manual criminal justice informational system, compiled by law enforcement agencies
for the purpose of identifying criminal offenders and alleged offenders and maintaining as to such
persons records of arrests, the nature and disposition of criminal charges, sentencing, confinement,
rehabilitation, and release . . . .”).
59
Id.
60
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
61
Id. § 552a(a)(4).
62
See, e.g., id. § 552(a)(2) (“To the extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy, an agency may delete identifying details . . . .”) (emphasis added).
55
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B. Data Elements from Selected U.S. State Laws
The complication from this sector-by-sector treatment of data
elements in the federal statutes is compounded by the fact individual states
also promulgate statutes to address personally identifiable information.63
Thus, in addition to variability in the treatment of private information from
business-sector to business-sector, there exists variability in the treatment of
private information from state to state.
Since many of the data elements from the federal laws overlap with
the data elements in state laws, we intentionally focus only on those statutes
that recite data elements that are absent from the federal statutes.64
Additionally, because California appears to have the most extensive privacy
laws,65 we limit our review to California,66 with the presumption other
63
By way of example, the state laws that touch on privacy include: bank records statutes; cable
television statutes; common law remedies for invasion of privacy; public disclosure of privacy facts,
defamation, and breach of duty of confidentiality; computer crime statutes; credit reporting statutes;
criminal justice information statutes; employment records statutes; fair information practices statutes;
genetic information statutes; insurance records statutes; media shield statutes; medical records statutes;
polygraph test statutes; privilege statutes (e.g., attorney-client privilege, patient-doctor privilege, priestpenitent privilege, etc.); school records statutes; stored wire communications statutes; tax return statutes;
telephone/facsimile solicitation; uniform commercial code; video privacy statutes; and wiretap statutes.
64
We note that a vast number of California statutes recite overlapping data elements, as those recited
in corresponding federal statutes. For example, various portions of California's Penal Code restrict use of
Social Security numbers, bank account numbers, etc. Since the goal is to identify unique data elements,
we omit any duplicative items in our analysis of California law.
65
See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17529, 17538.41, 17590-17594 (West 2008) (computer and
phone anti-spam); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575-22579 (West 2008), CAL. GOV’T CODE §§
6254.21, 11015.5 (West 2008) (online privacy); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22947-22947.6 (West
2008) (computer virus); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22948-22948.3 (West 2008) (anti-“phishing”);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (West 2009) (invasion of privacy); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1725, 1747.05,
1747.06, 1747.08, 1747.09 (West 2009) (credit cards); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1748.10-1748.12 (West 2009)
(information used for marketing); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1749.60-1749.66 (West 2009) (personal
information by supermarket clubs); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1785.1-1785.36, 1786-1786.60 (West 2009)
(consumer credit reporting); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1788-1788.33 (West 2009) (fair debt collection
practices); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798-1798.29 (West 2009) (state data collection and disclosure); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1798.24 (West 2009), CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10850 (West Supp. 2010) (personal
information for research); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29, 1798.82, 1798.84 (West 2009) (security breach
notice); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.79-1798.795 (West 2009) (RFID interception); CAL. CIV. CODE §§
1798.80-1798.81, 1798.81.5, 1798.83-1798.84 (West 2009) (personal information in business records);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.90.1 (West 2009) (“swiping” of driver's license information); CAL. CIV. CODE §
1798.91 (West 2009) (medical information for marketing purposes); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1799.1b (West
2009) (address change information); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1936 (West Supp. 2010) (rental car onboard
electronic surveillance); CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.7 (West Supp. 2010) (implant devices); CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 56-56.37 (West 2007 & Supp. 2010) (medical records); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 674 (West 2009),
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2024.5 (West 2004), CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 2191.3 (West Supp. 2010), CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 1798.85-1798.89, 1785.11.1, 1785.11.6 (West 2009), CAL. COM. CODE § 9526.5 (West Supp.
2010), CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66018.55 (West Supp. 2010), CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 27300-27307 (West
2008), CAL. LAB. CODE § 226 (West 2010) (Social Security Number); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 8909089090.5, 92630 (West Supp. 2010) (alumni information); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 2166.7, 2194, 8023,
8105, 8202, 8204 (West Supp. 2010), CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254.24 (West 2008) (voter privacy); CAL.
FIN. CODE §§ 4050-4060 (West Supp. 2010) (financial privacy); CAL. FIN. CODE § 4100 (West Supp.
2010) (bank account number reuse); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11019.9 (West 2005) (state privacy policy);
CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 6218-6218.05 (West 2008) (information of reproductive health care providers);
CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 6250-6268 (West 2008) (public records act); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 6254, 6267,
6276.28 (West 2008) (registration and circulation records for libraries); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 102230-102232, 103525-103528 (West 2006) (birth and death records); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
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jurisdictions will recite similar (if not identical) data elements for their
corresponding statutes. With that said, we now turn to these California
statutes to identify any data elements that are not expressly recited in the
federal statutes.67
California’s vehicle code section restricts the use of vehicle data
recorders,68 which track the following data elements related to an
individual’s vehicle: (a) speed; (b) direction; (c) locations visited; (d)
steering performance; (e) brake performance; (f) seatbelt use; and (g)
accident information.69
California also requires protection of confidential personal
information for crime victims,70 which California’s Penal Code defines as
including: (a) place of employment; (b) employee identification number; (c)
mother’s maiden name; (d) demand deposit account number; (e) savings
account number; (f) checking account number; and (g) credit card number.71
The California Penal Code recites additional data elements with
reference to bank account access cards, which include: (a) computer
password; (b) access code; (c) debit card number; (d) bank account number;
CODE §§ 120975-121020 (West 2006) (AIDS testing); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1280.15,
123110-123149.5 (West 2006 & West Supp. 2010) (patient records); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 791-791.28
(West 2005) (insurance information); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 293, 964 (West 2008 & West Supp. 2010),
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.79.8 (West 2009), CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254 (West 2008) (personal information
of victims); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4017.1, 5071 (West Supp. 2010), CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 219.5
(West 2008) (inmate jobs that give access to personal information); CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West
Supp. 2010) (computer crimes); CAL. PENAL CODE § 502.6 (West Supp. 2010) (credit card “skimming”);
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 629.50-629.98, 630-638 (West 1999 & West Supp. 2010) (electronic
eavesdropping by government); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2891.1 (West Supp. 2010) (cell phone
directories); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 2891-2894.10 (West Supp. 2010), CAL. PENAL CODE § 638 (West
1999) (prohibits utilities from disclosing telephone calling patterns); CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 11713.3,
11713.25 (West Supp. 2010) (personal information in automobile dealers’ computers); CAL. VEH. CODE
§§ 1808-1821 (West 2000) (personal information from Department of Motor Vehicles); CAL. VEH. CODE
§§ 40303, 40305, 40305.5, 40500, 40504 (West Supp. 2010), CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 182, 186.2, 529.7,
530.5-530.8, 786, 853.5-853.6 (West Supp. 2010), CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1748.95, 1788.2, 1788.18,
1798.92-1798.97 (West 2009), CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 4002 and 22470 (West Supp. 2010) (identity theft);
CAL. VEH. CODE § 9951 (West Supp. 2010) (vehicle data recorder); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5328
(West Supp. 2010) (psychiatric records).
66
Indeed, California’s State Constitution expressly recites “privacy” as an “inalienable right.” CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among
these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and
pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”). To advance the State’s constitutional guarantee
of privacy, California established a State Office of Privacy Protection. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11549.5(a)
(West Supp. 2010) (“The purpose of the Office . . . is to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of state systems and applications, and to promote and protect [consumer] privacy . . . to
ensure the trust of the residents of this state.”).
67
For all practical purposes, any company that operates nationwide or that has an Internet presence
will be required to adhere to the most restrictive privacy laws. Thus, while California's privacy laws are
theoretically limited to California's territorial boundaries, in practice California effectively dictates the
privacy law for all other states within the Union. For this reason, a review of California law is, in effect,
a review of the privacy law for all fifty states.
68
CAL. VEH. CODE § 9951(c) (West Supp. 2010).
69
Id. § 9951(b).
70
CAL. PENAL CODE § 964(a) (West 2008).
71
Id. § 964(b).
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and (e) numbering or coding which is employed in the issuance of access
cards.72 With reference to electronic eavesdropping by cable and television
operators, California’s Penal Code adds the following data elements: (a)
television viewing habits; (b) shopping choices; and (c) energy uses.73
To this already-growing list of data elements, California’s consumer
credit reporting laws add: (a) past delinquencies; (b) late payment history;
(c) irregular payment history; (d) insolvency; and (e) any form of default
information.74 Furthermore, the California Business and Professions Code
add purchase history and websites visited to the list of data elements.75
Insofar as data elements from other California statutes appear to be
duplicative of the data elements already recited, those statutes are not
discussed here.
III. SYNTHESIS OF CONCEPTS COMMON TO PRIVACY LAWS
Having identified many data elements present in both federal and
state statutes, we now provide some general observations on how state and
federal entities address these data elements.
Broadly, these privacy statutes fall into one of four distinct
structures, based on how the statutes are written. We discuss each of these
structures in turn.
A. Structure-1: Two Classes with No Specific Recitation of Data Elements
The first structure (referred to herein as “Structure-1”) includes
statutes that define two classes of data (protected and unprotected), but do
not provide useful guidance on how to determine which data element falls
within which class. One example of this type of statute is the Right to
Financial Privacy Act (“RFPA”), which protects financial records but does
not expressly define each of the data elements that are a part of an
individual’s financial records.76
Structure-1 statutes may be sufficient for easily-classifiable data
elements. For example, even without specific guidance, one can readily
decide a bank account number is a protected financial record, while a county
of residence is not a protected financial record.
However, because Structure-1 statutes provide little guidance on
which data elements fall squarely within the protected class, they become
problematic for data elements that are not so easily classifiable. For
72
73
74
75
76

Id. § 484j (West 1999).
Id. § 637.5(a)(2) (West Supp. 2010).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.26(a)(2) (West 2009).
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22947.1(k)(5)(D), (G) (West 2008).
See Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2006).
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example, it is unclear whether an individual’s income, standing alone, would
be a protected class data element or an unprotected class data element. Due
to this deficiency, we avoid the Structure-1 format in our proposed omnibus
privacy statute.
B. Structure-2: Three Classes with No Specific Recitation of Data Elements
The second structure (referred to herein as “Structure-2”) includes
statutes that define three classes of data (highly-protected, somewhat
protected, and unprotected), but do not provide useful guidance on how to
determine which data element falls within which class. One example of this
type of statute is the Criminal Justice Information Systems Act (“CJISA”).
As noted above, the CJISA recites several categories of information,
including research or statistical information,77 criminal history
information,78 and criminal intelligence information.79 However, the CJISA
provides little guidance on which data elements fall within the research or
statistical information or criminal intelligence information.
Structure-2 statutes suffer from the same deficiency as Structure-1
statutes, and for this reason we also avoid the Structure-2 format in our
proposed omnibus privacy statute.
C. Structure-3: Two Classes and a Specific Recitation of Data Elements
The third structure (referred to herein as “Structure-3”) includes
statutes that define two classes of data (protected and unprotected), and also
recite examples of specifically protected data elements. Catetory-3 statutes
include the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (“COPPA”)
and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).
As noted above, COPPA: (a) defines a protected class of data,
which it designates as personal information; and (b) expressly identifies data
elements it considers to be personal information, which includes (but is not
limited to) first name, last name, home address, other physical address,
street name, name of a city, name of a town, email address, telephone
number, and Social Security number.80
HIPAA also: (a) defines a protected class of data, which it
designates as protected health information; and (b) expressly identifies data
elements (referred to in the HIPAA as identifiers) it considers to be
protected health information,81 which includes (but is not limited to) names,
street addresses, cities, counties, precincts, zip codes, birth date, admission
77
78
79
80
81
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Criminal Justice Information Systems Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3789g(a) (2006).
Id. § 3789g(b).
Id. § 3789g(c).
Child Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8)(A)-(E) (2006).
45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i) (2009).
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date, discharge date, date of death, telephone numbers, fax numbers, email
addresses, Social Security numbers, medical record numbers, health plan
beneficiary numbers, account numbers, certificate/license numbers, vehicle
identifiers and serial numbers, license plate numbers, device identifiers and
serial numbers, web Universal Resource Locators (URLs), Internet Protocol
(IP) address numbers, and biometric identifiers (e.g., finger prints and voice
prints, and full face photographic (and any comparable) images).82
This binary nature of Structure-3 statutes provides a simple
classification of data elements. Also, insofar as Structure-3 statutes provide
a specific recitation of protected data elements, they remove much of the
ambiguity present in both Structure-1 and Structure-2 statutes.
One deficiency in a Structure-3 statute is its binary classification is
very coarse. Thus, a Structure-3 statute inherently forces any mid-level
sensitive information into a higher level of classification than necessary.
While this may not be problematic for the private sector, this becomes
somewhat problematic for the government sector because it removes much
of the government’s transparency to its own citizens by prohibiting
disclosure of more information than is necessary.83
D. Structure-4: Three Classes and a Specific Recitation of Data Elements
The last structure (referred to herein as “Structure-4”) includes
statutes that define three classes of data (highly-protected, somewhatprotected, and unprotected) and also recites examples of specificallyprotected data elements for each of these data classes. Structure-4 statutes
include the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”).
The DPPA: (a) identifies data elements; and (b) categorizes the
identified data elements into one of three distinct categories. The broad
category of personal information is defined as information that identifies an
individual, such as an individual’s: (a) “photograph”; (b) “social security
number”; (c) “driver identification number”; (d) “name”; (e) “address (but
not the 5-digit zip code)”; (f) “telephone number”; and (g) “medical or
disability information . . . .”84 Within the category of personal information
are those data elements the DPPA considers to be highly restricted personal
information, such as an individual’s: (a) “photograph or image”; (b) “Social
Security number”; and (c) “medical or disability information . . . .”85 The
DPPA also recites data elements specifically excluded from personal
82

Id.
The issue of whether the federal government or the state governments should collect personally
identifiable information on its own citizens is beyond the scope of this paper. We proceed with our
analysis with the presumption that personally identifiable data is collected, with the only question being
how it should be treated (both during collection and archiving).
84
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3) (2006).
85
Id. § 2725(4).
83
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information, such as: (a) information on vehicular accidents; (b) driving
violations; and (c) driver’s status.86 In short, the DPPA expressly recites
specific data elements that fall within three specific categories, namely: (a)
highly restricted personal information; (b) personal information that is not
highly restricted; and (c) information that is not subject to disclosure
restrictions.
The ternary structure employed by the DPPA provides a finer
classification than the coarser binary-classification of Structure-3 statutes.
As such, Structure-4 statutes address the deficiency of Structure-3 statutes
while also remedying the ambiguity of the Structure-1 and Structure-2
statutes.
E. Miscellaneous Issues
Before proceeding to our model omnibus privacy statute, we
address some peripherally-related issues. First, it seems intuitive that if a
ternary classification is better than a binary classification, then a finer data
class resolution (i.e., four data classes, five data classes, one hundred data
classes, etc.) would be even better. However, we note our goal is to achieve
uniformity in the treatment of data across many sectors, and increasing the
data class resolution contravenes uniformity. For this reason, we truncate
the number of data classes to three.87
Next, since the purpose of collecting information will be different
between sectors, we purposely craft the omnibus statute to allow for
different sector-by-sector uses, so long as the classifications of (and
consequently the protections afforded to) the data elements are uniform
across all sectors. In other words, the proposed statute dictates a uniform
classification and protection of data elements, but does not dictate the
purposes for which the categorized data elements are used within any
particular sector. By narrowly focusing on only classification and
protection, the proposed statute allows vast freedom within each sector to
use the collected data for that sector’s particular purpose, as long as the
required protections are met.
Lastly, we note others may disagree with our classification of each
data element (as proposed below). Thus, we fully recognize reasonable
minds can disagree on which data elements deserve more protection and
which data elements deserve less protection. With this in mind, we err by
being overly protective for data elements that (arguably) fall into multiple
data classes.
86

Id. § 2725(3).
We fully admit that our selection of three classes (rather than four or more classes) is somewhat
arbitrary. However, we did not go beyond three data classes because none of the currently-reviewed
statutes went beyond three data classes.
87
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It is also important to reestablish this analysis is element driven.
Therefore, when considering an element’s risk classification (e.g., high-risk,
medium-risk, or low-risk), the element is considered in isolation and not in
combination with other elements. This combination can directly impact
whether the element remains individually identifiable and thus whether the
associated risk may change.88 It is for this reason an entity’s policies on
information collection and use clearly define how each element or category
of elements will be used to ensure accountability for elevated risk associated
with these elements as a result of combination.
With that said, we now propose our model omnibus privacy statute.
IV. PROPOSED FEDERAL OMNIBUS PRIVACY STATUTE
(a)

Short Title
(1)

(b)

(c)

This chapter shall be known as the “Federal Omnibus
Privacy Act.”

Congressional Findings
(1)

The Congress finds that different entities in various
sectors (business and government) collect information
from individuals;

(2)

The Congress further finds that substantially similar
information is collected from individuals, even
though the information may be collected for different
purposes;

(3)

The Congress further finds that sometimes the
treatment of collected information varies from sector
to sector;

(4)

It is the purpose of this chapter to provide uniformity
in the collection and treatment of information across
these various sectors.

Definitions
(1)

“agent” means employee, officer, director, or any
other entity that acts on behalf of, or receives
direction from, an organization, whether that entity be
internal to the organization or external to the
organization.

88
While not consulted for purposes of this article, essential to the discussion of the categorization of
elements is the statistical analysis of such data elements and their likelihood of combination across
publicly available and private data sets in the digital age. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATISTICAL POLICY WORKING PAPER 22 (SECOND VERSION, 2005):
REPORT ON STATISTICAL DISCLOSURE LIMITATION METHODOLOGY (2005).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol35/iss3/4

2010]

MODEL OMNIBUS PRIVACY STATUTE

365

(2)

“aggregate” means to combine data elements in any
manner.

(3)

“collect” means to request, accumulate, gather, or
otherwise obtain. Collection precedes either “use” or
“sharing.”

(4)

“data element” means information that is, standing
alone, distinct. An original and a copy of any data
element shall be treated in the same manner. Every
data element falls within one of the following
mutually-exclusive classes: (i) high-risk data element;
(ii) mid-risk data element; and (iii) low-risk data
element.

(5)

“high-risk data element” means a data element that,
standing alone, has the ability to: (i) identify an
individual; and/or (ii) expose an individual to either
economic or non-economic harm as a result of
unauthorized disclosure. Examples of high-risk data
elements include:
(A) access code (e.g., passwords,
identification number (PIN), etc.);

personal

(B) account number (e.g., bank account, checking
account, credit card account, debit account,
demand deposit account, savings account,
etc.);
(C) address (home address, other physical
address, street name, street number, zip
code);
(D) biometric identifier
voiceprint, DNA, etc.);

(e.g.,

fingerprint,

(E) device identifier (e.g., device serial number,
Media Access Control (MAC) address,
Internet Protocol (IP) address, Universal
Resource Locator (URL), etc.);
(F) email address;
(G) employment
(e.g.,
current
employer,
employment history, previous employer,
etc.);
(H) fax number;

Published by eCommons, 2009

366

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

(I) financial
transactions
(e.g.,
withdrawals, fund transfers, etc.);

[Vol. 35:3

deposits,

(J) images (e.g., photograph);
(K) medical information (e.g., health plan
beneficiary number, medical history, mental
problems, psychological problems, health
problems, disability information, etc.);
(L) name (e.g., first name, last name, mother’s
maiden name, etc.);
(M) privileged information (e.g., attorney-client,
priest-penitent, doctor-patient, psychiatristpatient, etc.);
(N) telephone number;
(O) unique identifying characteristic, code, or
number (e.g., driver’s license number,
employee identification number, Social
Security number, taxpayer identification
number, medical record number, or any other
identifying characteristic, identification code,
identification number, or identification
symbol that is assigned to an individual); and
(P) vehicle identifiers (e.g., vehicle
number, license plate number, etc.).

serial

(6)

“de-identification” means to render information not
individually identifiable.

(7)

“encrypt” means to transform information using a
cipher to make the information only readable to those
possessing a deciphering key.

(8)

“essential business purpose” means a purpose
directly related to the reason that an individual
provided a data element.

(9)

“low-risk data element” means a data element that is
behavioral or attributable to a population as much as
it is attributable to any individual. No high-risk or
medium-risk data elements are contained within the
set of low-risk data elements. Examples of low-risk
data elements include:
(A) activities (e.g., sports, clubs, events, etc.);
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(B) awards;
(C) behavioral characteristics89 (e.g., anti-social
behavior, demeaning behavior, illegal
behavior, self-incriminating behavior, etc.);
(D) default (financial);
(E) driver’s status;
(F) education
(e.g.,
degrees,
academic
institutions, major field of study, etc.);
(G) eye color;
(H) hair color;
(I) height;
(J) vehicle performance information (e.g., brake
performance, direction of travel, seatbelt use,
vehicle speed, vehicle steering performance,
etc.); and
(K) weight.
(10) “mid-risk data element” means a data element that,
when combined with at least one other data element,
has the ability to: (i) identify an individual; and/or (ii)
expose an individual to economic or non-economic
harm. Examples of mid-risk data elements include,
but are not limited to:
(A) city or town (e.g., city of residence, city of
employment, city of birth, etc.);
(B) criminal history (e.g., accident information,
confinement, disposition of criminal charges,
driving violations, nature of criminal charges,
penalties, record of arrests, rehabilitation
information, release, sentencing, etc.);
(C) consumer characteristics90 (e.g., consumer
credit capacity, consumer credit standing,
consumer credit worthiness, consumer’s
general reputation, consumer’s mode of
89
Characteristics can often be presumed to be individually identifiable. This is not always the case.
Whether or not someone is creditworthy is not, by itself, individually identifiable. However, when
combined with another element such as age, gender and 5-digit zip code, the characteristic may take on
individually identifiable properties.
90
See id. and accompanying text.
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living, consumer’s personal characteristics,
credit and debt payment amounts, credit and
debt payment history, insolvencies, interest
payments, past delinquencies, purchase or
payment receipts, etc.);
(D) county (e.g., county of residence, county of
employment, county of birth, etc.);
(E) dates (e.g., date of birth, date of death, dates
of attendance, date of admittance, date of
discharge, etc.);
(F) political
information
(e.g.,
political
affiliations, political beliefs, voting history,
voting precinct, etc.);
(G) religious
information
(e.g.,
affiliations, religious beliefs,
practices, etc.);

religious
religious

(H) sex (e.g., sexual
behavior, etc.);

attitudes,

orientation,

(I) tax information (e.g., assets, exemptions,
forfeitures, income, tax credits, tax
deductions, tax deficiencies, tax liabilities,
tax overassessments, tax payments, taxes
withheld, tax penalties, fines, net worth, past
delinquencies, tax payment history, tax
receipts, etc.); and
(J) vehicle locations visited.
(11) “organization” means any business or governmental
entity, including but not limited to a corporation, a
partnership, a limited liability company, a
governmental agency, a sole proprietorship, and any
other entity that collects and uses the subject data
elements as it transacts business.
(12) “retain” means to keep, store, or otherwise maintain
in any manner as to permit use.
(13) “security permission” means authorization granted
to access information.
(14) “share” means to transmit, distribute, disseminate,
convey, transfer or otherwise disclose in any manner
to an entity that is external to an organization.
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Sharing follows collection.
(15) “use” means to access, copy, retrieve, combine,
disclose, truncate, alter, or otherwise process in any
manner solely within an organization. Any use of
data elements external to the organization shall be
considered to be sharing of the data elements. Use
follows collection.
(d)

High-Risk Data Elements
(1)

General Requirements: Any organization that
collects, uses, and/or shares high-risk data elements
must have clearly-established and published policies
and procedures91 for collecting, using, and/or sharing
the high-risk data elements by the organization and
any of its agents. These policies and procedures must
clearly explain the organization’s essential business
purposes for collecting, using, and/or sharing the
high-risk data elements.

(2)

Requirements for Collecting High-Risk Data
Elements: Any organization that collects high-risk
data elements from any individual:
(A) Must identify the high-risk data elements that
are being collected;
(B) Must provide clear notice to the individual
that the individual is sharing high-risk data
elements with the organization;
(C) Must clearly explain the organization’s
essential business purposes for collecting the
individual’s high-risk data elements;
(D) Must affirmatively obtain verifiable consent
from the individual to collect the high-risk
data elements; and
(E) Must provide a copy of, or access to, the
organization’s policies and procedures to the
individual.

91
Policies and procedures can be both internal and external to a company. Thus, the use of the
terms here specifies those a customer should expect to see published. The use of the terms in this context
is not meant to suggest a company should disclose all of its data processing policies and procedures, but
rather those that a customer must understand prior to consenting to the use of his/her personally
identifiable information.
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Requirements for Using High-Risk Data Elements:
(A) Essential Business Purposes and Restricted
Actors: An organization may freely use an
individual’s high-risk data elements without
informing the individual or obtaining consent
from the individual only if both of the
following two (2) conditions are met:
(i)

Limited Access: Only agents that are
internal to an organization and who
have predefined job titles or
predefined security permissions
establishing a “need to know”92 may
use the individual’s high-risk data
elements; and

(ii)

Limited Purpose: An organization
may use the individual’s high-risk
data elements only for the
organization’s essential business
purposes, which have been clearly
conveyed to the individual prior to
the organization’s use of the high-risk
data elements.

(B) Restricted Actors and Other Business
Uses: An organization may use an
individual’s high-risk data elements for a use
other than an essential business purpose,
provided, however, that the organization:
(i)

Must limit use of the high-risk data
elements to only the organization’s
agents that are internal to the
organization
and
who
have
predefined job titles or predefined
security permissions;

(ii)

Must provide clear notice to the
individual that the individual’s highrisk data elements are being used for
a purpose other than an essential

92
“Need to know” is a generally accepted tenant of privacy compliance supporting a “minimum
use” policy. Personally identifiable information should be minimally used only to the extent necessary to
accomplish the business purpose for which it was collected. This includes minimizing access to this
information to only those in an organization who are essential to executing that business purpose.
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business
purpose,
to
include
providing a detailed explanation to
the individual of the purposes for
which the individual’s high-risk data
elements are being used;
(iii) Must identify the individual’s highrisk data elements that are being used
for those purposes;
(iv)

Must obtain verifiable consent from
the individual to use the high-risk
data elements for those purposes; and

(v)

Must de-identify the high-risk data
elements prior to those uses.

(C) Limitations on Data Retention: An
organization shall not retain high-risk data
elements, except for:

(4)

(i)

Retention Period: a period of time
that is necessary to accomplish the
business purpose for which the highrisk data elements were collected or
is required by law; and

(ii)

Encrypted
Retention:
in
an
encrypted form at the most secure
encryption level that is commercially
reasonable for the organization’s
industry.

Requirements for Sharing High-Risk Data
Elements: For an organization to share an
individual’s high-risk data elements, the organization:
(A) Must determine that sharing the high-risk
data elements is reasonably necessary to
advance an essential business purpose of the
organization and that there is no reasonable
alternative
to
accomplishing
the
organization’s essential business purpose
without sharing the individual’s high-risk
data elements;
(B) Must ensure that the entity with which the
organization will share the high-risk data
elements
has
clearly-established
and
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published policies and procedures that are not
less protective of the high-risk data elements
than the organization’s policies and
procedures;
(C) Must provide clear notice to the individual
that the individual’s high-risk data elements
will be shared;
(D) Must identify the entity with which the
organization will share the individual’s highrisk data elements;
(E) Must provide a detailed explanation to the
individual on why it is necessary to share the
individual’s high-risk data elements;
(F) Must identify the individual’s high-risk data
elements that are being shared;
(G) Must affirmatively obtain verifiable consent
from the individual to share the high-risk data
elements;
(H) Must, if possible, de-identify the high-risk
data elements prior to sharing the high-risk
data elements; and
(I) Must encrypt the high-risk data elements at
the most secure encryption level that is
commercially
reasonable
for
the
organization’s industry prior to sharing the
high-risk data elements.
(e)

Mid-Risk Data Elements
(1)

General Requirements: Any organization that
collects, uses, and/or shares any mid-risk data
elements must have clearly-established and published
policies and procedures for collecting, using, and/or
sharing the mid-risk data elements by the organization
and/or any of its agents.
These policies and
procedures must clearly explain the organization’s
essential business purposes for collecting, using,
and/or sharing the mid-risk data elements.93

93
We support using existing models for information collection, such as the Fair Information Practice
Principles, to govern these procedural requirements. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FAIR INFORMATION
PRACTICE PRINCIPLES (June 25, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm.
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Requirements for Collecting Mid-Risk Data
Elements: Any organization that collects mid-risk
data elements from any individual:
(A) Must identify the mid-risk data elements that
are being collected;
(B) Must provide clear notice to the individual
that the individual is sharing mid-risk data
elements with the organization;
(C) Must affirmatively obtain verifiable consent
from the individual to collect the mid-risk
data elements; and
(D) Must provide a copy of, or access to, the
organization’s data collection policies and
procedures to the individual.

(3)

Requirements for Using Mid-Risk Data Elements:
(A) Essential
Business
Purpose:
An
organization may use mid-risk data elements
for the organization’s essential business
purpose without informing the individual or
obtaining consent from the individual;
(B) Aggregation and Research: An organization
may freely use mid-risk data elements for
aggregation or research without informing the
individual or obtaining consent from the
individual, provided, however, that the
organization must de-identify the mid-risk
data elements prior to aggregation or
research.
(C) All Uses Other than for Essential Business
Purposes: For any use of an individual’s
mid-risk data elements other than an essential
business purpose the organization:
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which the individual’s mid-risk data
elements are being used;
(iii) Must identify the individual’s midrisk data elements that are being used
for those purposes; and
(iv)

(4)

Must affirmatively obtain verifiable
consent from the individual to use the
mid-risk data elements for those
purposes.

Requirements for Sharing Mid-Risk Data
Elements: An organization may share an individual’s
mid-risk data elements, provided, however, that:
(A) The organization must de-identify the midrisk data elements prior to sharing the midrisk data elements; or
(B) The organization:
(i)

Must provide clear notice to the
individual that the individual’s midrisk data elements will be shared;

(ii)

Must identify the entity with which
the organization will share the
individual’s mid-risk data elements;

(iii) Must identify the individual’s midrisk data elements that are being
shared; and
(iv)

(f)

Low-Risk Data Elements
(1)

(g)

Must affirmatively obtain verifiable
consent from the individual to share
the mid-risk data elements.

General Requirements: Any organization that
collects, uses, and/or shares only low-risk data
elements may do so without restriction.

Collecting, Using, and/or Sharing Multiple Categories of
Data Elements
(1)
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organization shall ensure that each data element is
collected, used, and/or shared in accordance with its
respective requirements as set forth in the Federal
Omnibus Privacy Act.
(2)

Template for Collection of Data Elements: An
organization that collects data elements of different
classifications (e.g., high-risk data elements, mid-risk
data elements, and low-risk data elements) shall be in
compliance with the collection procedures set forth in
the Federal Omnibus Privacy Act if the data elements
are collected using a form that is substantially
identical to the form set forth in Appendix A.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this paper, we propose a model omnibus privacy statute. In doing
so, we attempt to unify the treatment of data across differing sectors without
unduly hampering an organization’s operations. Our approach allows each
sector, and indeed each organization within a sector, to define for itself what
would constitute an essential business purpose. Thus, the statute provides
great latitude for organizations, as long as they comply with the uniform
requirements for how data elements are collected, retained, and shared.
In proposing our model omnibus privacy statute, we adopt a ternary
structure that permits segregation of data elements into three distinct
classifications, namely, high-risk data elements, mid-risk data elements, and
low-risk data elements. As with all structures, the ternary structure has its
advantages and disadvantages. Thus, we freely admit this ternary structure
has its limitations. However, in our humble opinion, we believe it provides
a reasonable balance between a coarse binary structure and an overly
complicated four-plus-tiered structure.
Lastly, we harvested from currently existing statutes every data
element we could find and assigned each data element to a particular data
classification. We did so in an effort to provide clearer guidance on how
each data element should be treated, irrespective of whether it is in the
financial sector, the healthcare sector, the government sector, or whatnot.
By expressly reciting every conceivable data element and categorizing it, we
maximize the uniformity in data treatment across multiple sectors.
Lastly, as noted at the outset, our purpose was not to advocate for
(or against) a federal omnibus privacy statute. Rather, presuming Congress
chooses to press forward with an omnibus privacy statute, our goal was to
provide one way in which such a statute could (and in our humble opinion
should) be penned.
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APPENDIX A: TEMPLATE FOR COLLECTION OF
PERSONALLY-IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION.
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